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NOTES
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-DECISIONMAKER BIAS AND THE PRO
CEDURAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF WITHDRAWING EMPLOYERS
UNDER THE MPPAA
INTRODUCTION

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently found that a
vital provision of the MUltiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act
of 1980 1 (MPP AA) violates the fifth amendment due process rights of
contributing employers. In United Retail & Wholesale Employees
Teamsters Union Local 115 Pension Plan v. Yahn & McDonnell, Inc.,2
a federal court of appeals held for the first time that the decisionmak
ing process for determining an employer's liability payments to a mul
tiemployer pension plan, 3 upon its withdrawal from that plan, denied
the employer its right to procedural due process. 4 The United States
1. 29 U.S.c. §§ 1381-1461 (1982).
2. 787 F.2d 128 (3d Cir. 1986), prob. juris. noted, 107 S. Ct. 567 (1986).
3. There are four types of private pension plans: (I) union plans; (2) corporate plans;
(3) single-employer plans; and (4) multiemployer plans. Note, MPPAA Withdrawal Liabil
ity Assessment: Letting the Fox Guard the Henhouse, 14 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 211, 215
(1986). 29 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(3) (1982) defines a multiemployer pension plan as a pension
plan to which more than one employer contributes and which is maintained pursuant to
one or more collective bargaining agreements between one or more employee organizations
and more than one employer. Multiemployer plans are attractive to employers both to
avoid industrial strife by fostering cooperation among employers, employees and labor or
ganizations, and for tax benefits. See Note, supra at 219.
4. Although the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit ruled the decision making
provisions unconstitutional in Keith Fulton & Sons, Inc. v. New England Teamsters &
Trucking Indus. Pension Fund, Inc., 762 F.2d 1124 (1st Cir. 1984), that decision was va
cated in a subsequent hearing by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit sitting en bane
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Supreme Court recently noted probable jurisdiction in the Yahn case
and will render a decision on the constitutionality of the MPPAA's
decisionmaking process late in the 1986 term. 5 *
This note examines the constitutionality of the MPPAA's deci
sionmaking process. It begins with a discussion of the history and
statutory structure of the MPPAA. Section II of the note examines
the basis for the employers' procedural due process rights and the rea
soning in the chronological progression of majority opinions in cases
upholding the constitutionality of the MPPAA. The third section
analyzes the opinions urging, and in Yahn, holding, that the MP
PAA's decisionmaking procedures are unconstitutional. The focus of
the note then turns to the merits of the competing arguments and a
discussion of the appropriate standard for evaluating a claimed viola
tion of the procedural due process right to an impartial decisionmaker.
The final section of the note discusses the appropriate remedy for cur
ing the problem of decisionmaker bias. This section analyzes whether
the Yahn court, after holding the MPPAA to be unconstitutional in
part, adequately remedied the constitutional flaw by severing a defec
tive statutory provision.
I.

HISTORY AND STATUTORY PROCEDURES OF THE MPPAA

In an attempt to promote the creation and maintenance of private
pension plans and to secure pension benefits, 6 Congress enacted the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). 7 Title
IV of ERISA established an insurance program to protect employees
and retirees whose pension plans terminated without sufficient funds
to pay vested benefits. 8 To achieve this goal, Congress created the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC)9 which was to "pro
vide for the timely and uninterrupted payment of pension benefits to
participants and beneficiaries" of terminated plans. \0
in Keith Fulton & Sons, Inc. v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension Fund,
Inc., 762 F.2d 1137 (1st Cir. 1985).
5. United Retail & Wholesale Employees Teamsters Union Local 115 Pension Plan
v. Yahn & McDonnell, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 567 (1986).
6. See H.R. REP. No. 869, Part I, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 [hereinafter House Re·
port], reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2918, 2919. See generally 29
U.S.c. § 1001(a) (1982).
7. 29 U.S.c. §§ 1001·1381 (1982). ERISA applies to all private pension plans.
8. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301·1381 (1982); see H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 14,
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 4639, 4652.
9. 29 U.S.C. § 1302 (1982).
10.

Id.

• Editor's Note-On May 18, 1987, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
Yahn decision by an equally divided Court. Justice White took no part in the consideration
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Under ERISA an employer who withdrew from a pension plan
had a contingent liability to that plan. II If the plan terminated within
five years from the date of the employer's withdrawal, the employer
was liable to the PBGC for as much as thirty percent of the company's
net worth. 12 Under this system, an employer who withdrew more
than five years before the plan's termination escaped liability and the
remaining employers were forced to compensate for the lost revenue.
As a result of these contingent liability provisions, multiemployer pen
sion plans were faced with a serious threat of widespread withdrawal
as employers sought to avoid or limit their liability.13
As serious questions arose as to the viability of the PBGC, and
faced with the possibility of termination of many of the multiemployer
pension plans, Congress ordered a study by the PBGC of the plans. 14
After consideration of the study, Congress passed the Multiemployer
Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980. 15
Under the MPPAA, an employer who withdraws from a pension
plan incurs a mandatory liability to that plan for a portion of its "un
funded vested benefits"16 as determined under the Act. 17 Upon an em
ployer's withdrawal, the liability, known as withdrawal liability, is
calculated by the plan's sponsor. 18 The plan's sponsor is statutorily
defined as the trustees,19 who are selected by the employers and the
unions, each side being equally represented. 20 The trustees have a
of the case. United Retail & Wholesale Employee Teamsters Union Local ll5 Pension
Plan v. Yahn & McDonnell, Inc., 55 U.S.L.W. 4662 (1987).
II. House Report, supra note 6, at 54, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD
MIN. NEWS at 2922.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 55, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 2923. The
legislative history notes that as employers withdrew to avoid liability, the contributions by
the remaining employers, to sustain the plan's solvency, became so great that it was
cheaper to withdraw and make the liability payments. Id.
14. Pub. L. No. 95-214, 91 Stat. 1501 (1977). For a brief summary of the financial
instability of the multiemployer pension plans, as reported in the PBGC study, see Note,
supra note 3, at 224 n.79.
15. Congress passed the MPPAA without much resistance. For a summary of the
congressional voting record on the Act, see Note, supra note 3, at 255 n.84.
16. 29 U.S.c. § 1381(a) (1982) establishes the mandatory liability and 29 U.S.C.
§ 1393(c) (1982) defines "unfunded vested benefits" as "an amount equal to-the value of
nonforfeitable benefits under the plan, less the value of the assets of the plan."
17. 29 U.S.c. §§ 1381-1461 (1982).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 1382 (1982).
19. 29 U.S.c. § lOO2(16)(B)(iii) (1982). In this section, Congress defined the plan
sponsor as the board of trustees in the multiemployer pension plan context. The trustees
are appointed pursuant to 29 U.S.c. § l102(a).
20. 29 U.S.C. § l103(a) (1982), which requires that [he employee benefit plan be held
in trust by one or more trustees, is controlled by 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(B) (1982), which
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statutorily-created fiduciary duty to act in the best interest of the
plan's participants and beneficiaries. 21
The determination of withdrawal liability is a two step process:
1) selection of a method of calculation; and 2) calculation of with
drawal liability under the chosen method. The trustees must base
their calculation of withdrawal liability under the MPP AA on anyone
of four separate methods set forth in the Act or by a method author
ized by the PBGC.22 Although the choice of a particular method is
occasioned by the withdrawal of a employer, the trustees must uni
formly apply the chosen method to all withdrawing employers, includ
ing the present employer and any subsequent withdrawing employer. 23
Because of this mandate, the trustees must determine which one of the
several methods of calculation permitted by 29 U.S.c. § 1391 is best
provides for equal representation of both employees and employers in the administration of
trust funds. Thus, both the employee organization and the employers collectively, must
appoint a minimum of one representative each.
21. 29 U.S.c. § 1102(a)(2) (1982) provides that the plan's trustees owe a fiduciary
duty. 29 U.S.c. § ll04(a) (1982) specifies that:
[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest
of the participants and beneficiaries and
(A) for the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan;
(B) with the care, skill, prudence and diligence under the circumstances then
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such
matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character with like
aims ....
If fiduciaries breach their duty, they are personally liable to the plan for any losses the
plan incurs as a result of the breach. 29 U.S.c. § 1109(a) (1982).
22. The Act prescribes a presumptive method for the calculation of withdrawal lia
bility. 29 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1982). A multiemployer plan may, however, be amended to
permit calculation of withdrawal liability under one of three methods described in 29
U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1982). The legislative history indicates that Congress prescribed four
different methods to account for differing periods and amounts of contribution by employ
ers. For instance, the presumptive method is designed to protect newly entering employers
from having to fund liabilities that built up before they began contributing. See House
Report, supra note 6, at 77-82, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at
2945-50. For a description of the four methods of calculation, see J. MAMORSKY, EM
PLOYEE BENEFITS LAW: ERISA AND BEYOND § 9.03[3][c] (1986). A plan may also de
velop an alternative calculation method, subject to approval by the PBGC. 29 U.S.c.
§ 1391(c)(5)(A) (1982).
23. 29 U.S.c. § 1394(b) (1982) states:
All plan rules and amendments authorized under this part [29 USCS §§ 1381 et
seq.] shall operate and be applied uniformly with respect to each employer, except
that special provisions may be made to take into account the creditworthiness of
an employer. The plan sponsor shall give notice to all employers who have an
obligation to contribute under the plan and to all employee organizations repre
senting employees covered under the plan of any rules or amendments adopted
pursuant to this section.
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suited to accommodate not only the present withdrawal, but all future
withdrawals from the plan as well. In this regard, and to the extent
that their decision focuses on circumstances and considerations not
specifically linked to the first employer withdrawing from the plan, the
thrust of the trustees' initial determination is largely prospective and
based on estimations of future events.
However, once the trustees have chosen a particular calculation
method, the actual calculation of withdrawal liability pursuant to the
chosen method primarily involves determinations based on legal and
factual issues specific to each individual withdrawal from the plan.
There are several such determinations. An important one is the deci
sion as to when the employer actually withdrew from the plan. The
Act recognizes partia}24 and complete25 withdrawals. The determina
tion of whether, and when, a withdrawal has been effected turns on
sharply contested factual findings and legal conclusions, and has im
portant financial consequences for the employer and the plan. 26
Another determination that is used in the calculation of with
drawal liability, and that is also specific to each withdrawing em
ployer, is the establishment of actuarial assumptions to facilitate the
computation of the unfunded vested benefits. The trustees must de
cide when the employees covered by the plan are going to retire, how
long they will live, and how much income the fund's assets are going
24. 29 U.S.C. § 1385 (1982).
25. 29 U.s.c. § 1383 (1982).
26. Except for withdrawals by employers engaged in the building and construction,
or entertainment industries, whose withdrawals are defined by 29 U.S.C. §§ I 383(b) & (c)
(1982), respectively, complete withdrawal "occurs when an employer--<I) permanently
ceases to have an obligation to contribute under the plan, or (2) permanently ceases all
covered operations under the plan." 29 U.S.c. § 1383(a) (1982).
The trustees and, in tum, the arbitrators and courts have considerable discretion in
deciding the withdrawal date under the statute. See, e.g., UMW 1974 Pension Plan v.
Williamson Shaft Contracting Co., 6 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1593 (1985) (Pritzker,
Arb.). In this case an arbitrator ruled that an employer had withdrawn, notwithstanding
the employer's argument that he was still making bids for which he would have to contrib
ute, when the employer had not contributed to the plan since 1981 and the number of bids
covered by the plan dropped from seventy in 1980 to zero in 1984. Id. at 1600. In Pension
Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Broadway Maintenance Co., 707 F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1983), the court
stated that only two factors should be considered in setting a withdrawal date: I) the expec
tation of plan participants, and 2) the financial implications for the PBGC. Id. at 652. The
court further stated that the financial interests of the employer are not of importance. Id.
Thus, under Broadway Maintenance, the Williamson Shaft withdrawal date reasonably
could have been set earlier by establishing that the plan participants no longer expected
work once the contributions stopped and the bids began to dramatically decline. The
PBGC would have favored an earlier withdrawal date because it would have reduced its
potential liability for payment.
'
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to earn in the future. 27 Since these actuarial calculations are "as much
an art as science,"28 the statute affords the plans' trustees considerable
discretion in making these actuarial assumptions. The MPP AA re
quires only that the withdrawal liability be calculated by "actuarial
assumptions and methods which, in the aggregate, are reasonable . . .
and which, in combination, offer the actuary's best estimate."29 Thus,
as with the determination of employers' withdrawal dates, the choice
of actuarial assumptions is based on legal and factual determinations
extrapolated from the specific circumstances of the withdrawing
employers.
After the trustees calculate an employer's withdrawal liability,
the plan must notify the employer of the liability and the proposed
payment schedule, and demand payment. 30 Within ninety days after
the employer receives notice of the withdrawal liability, it may ask the
trustees to review their decision,31 Following "reasonable review" of
matters presented by the employer, the plan must notify the employer
of its final decision. 32 If there is still a dispute between the parties,
either party may initiate arbitration. 33
27. There are three basic actuarial assumptions used for computing unfunded vested
benefits. Eberhard Foods, Inc. v. Retail Store Employees Unions Joint Pension Fund, 6
Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1961, 1969 (1985) (Glover, Arb.). The assumptions ad
dress: 1) mortality rates; 2) retirement ages; and 3) future interest rates for the plan's
investments. Id. The first two figures are specific to each withdrawing employer, and help
to determine the amount and timing of benefits due the employees of the withdrawing
employer. The interest rate is also employer-specific and helps to project the future assets
of the plan from the time of the withdrawal.
The selection of these assumptions directly controls the withdrawal liability of the
employer. Different assumptions produce different results. In Hertz Corp. v. Commission
Drivers Local 182 Pension Fund, 4 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1367 (1983) (Mit
telman, Arb.), an arbitrator upheld an assessed withdrawal liability of $416,000.00. The
plan's assumed interest rate for investment returns was deemed reasonable, even though a
calculation of withdrawal liability for the same company using rates promulgated by the
PBGC was $321,672.00. Id. at 1385. Thus, the legal and factual determinations made by
the trustees in establishing their actuarial assumptions can alter the withdrawal liability by
tens of thousands of dollars. See infra note 216 for another example of the trustees' discre
tion in calculating withdrawal liability.
28. Note, Trading Fairness for Efficiency: Constitutionality of the Dispute Resolution
Procedures of the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980,71 GEO. L.J. 161,
167 (1982).
29. 29 U.S.C. § 1393(a)(I) (1982).
30. 29 U.S.C. § 1399(b)(1) (1982).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 1399(b)(2)(A) (1982). The employer has three possibilities for re
view under this section: (I) ask the trustees to review a specific matter related to the liabil
ity or schedule of payment; (2) identify an inaccuracy in the determination of unfunded
vested benefits; (3) furnish additional relevant information to the trustees.
32. 29 U.S.C. § 1399 (b)(2)(B) (1982).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (1982). Under this section either party may initiate arbitra
tion within sixty days after the earlier of the date the employer is notified of the trustees'
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During arbitration, all findings of the trustees, including findings
on withdrawal liability, are presumed correct. 34 This presumption can
be overcome only by showing, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the plan's determination was unreasonable or clearly erroneous. 3S
If not satisfied after arbitration, either party may bring an action to
"enforce, vacate or modify" the arbitrator's findings. 36 In this action,
the court will presume the arbitrator's findings to be correct and may
overturn them only if shown to be "clearly erroneous" by a preponder
ance of the evidence. 37

II.

JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF PROCEDURAL
DUE PROCESS CHALLENGES

Since its enactment, employers have mounted a series of constitu
tional assaults on the MPPAA. 38 One such challenge attacks the
Act's provisions for decisionmaking by the plan's trustees. More spe
cifically, the employers argue that the trustees' involvement in deter
mining withdrawal liability infringes the employers' procedural due
process rights to an impartial decisionmaker. To date, six circuits
have considered this claim, and all but one have upheld the constitu
tionality of the MPPAA. 39
review decision, or 120 days after the employer's request for review. The parties may
jointly initiate arbitration within 180 days after the plan demands payment of the with
drawalliability from the employer. Arbitration under this section is to be conducted under
fair and equitable procedures promulgated by the PBGC.
34. 29 U.S.C. § 140I(a)(3)(A) (1982).
35. Id. If a party contests the determination of unfunded vested benefits, that deter
mination is presumed correct during arbitration and the presumption may be overcome
only with a showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the determination was based
on unreasonable actuarial assumptions or methods, or that the plan's actuary made a sig
nificant error.
36. 29 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1982). After arbitration is completed, either party may
bring an action in the United States District Court to contest the findings.
37. 29 U.S.C. § 140I(c) (1982). This section is similar to 29 U.S.C. 140I(a) in that
the arbitrator's findings must be presumed correct by the district court. However, the defer
ence to the previous findings is greater at this stage as the presumption can be overcome
only by "a clear preponderance of the evidence." 29 U.S.C. § 140I(c) (1982) (emphasis
added).
38. See, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717 (1984).
In this case an employer challenged the retroactive application of the MPP AA. Congress
passed the Act on September 26, 1980, but applied it retroactively to April 29, 1980. In
R.A. Gray, the Court found that the retroactive application did not violate due process. Id.
at 728-34. In Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1018 (1986), the trustees
of a pension plan claimed that the MPPAA violates the fifth amendment by taking prop
erty without just compensation. The trustees claimed, inter alia, that the statutory scheme
of the MPPAA destroys contractual rights between the employers and employees. Id. at
1025. The Court rejected the trustees' arguments. Id. at 1024-28.
39. United Retail & Wholesale Employees Teamsters Union Local liS Pension Plan
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Each of the six circuits that reviewed the decisionmaking process
of the MPPAA assumed that the employer had a constitutional right
to some sort of procedural due process protection; the disagreement
among the courts centers on the extent of the protection. Sections II
(B) and II (C) explore those differences in detail. Prior to that discus
sion, however, the note examines an issue that the courts did not fully
address, the threshold issue of whether the employers are entitled to
any due process protection.
A.

The Threshold Requirement for Procedural
Due Process Protection

The threshold question in determining the procedural due process
rights of withdrawing employers under the MPPAA is whether the
trustees' role in calculating withdrawal liability is adjudicative or legis
lative.40 If the trustees' role is adjudicative, then the employers enjoy
the "trial-type requirements" of procedural due process. 41 However,
if the trustees are acting legislatively, as rulemakers, the withdrawing
employers may not have the protection of the fifth amendment due
process rights. 42
v. Yahn & McDonnell, Inc., 787 F.2d 128 (3d Cir. 1986) (unconstitutional), prob. juris.
noted, 107 S. Ct. 567 (1986); Keith Fulton & Sons, Inc. v. New England Teamsters &
Trucking Indus. Pension Fund, Inc., 762 F.2d 1137 (1st Cir. 1985); Board of Trustees of
the W. Conference of Teamsters Pension Fund, Inc. v. Thompson Bldg. Materials, Inc. 749
F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985); Washington Star Co. v.
International Typographical Union Negotiated Pension Plan, 729 F.2d 1502 (D.C. Cir.
1984); Textile Workers Pension Fund v. Standard Dye & Finishing Co., 725 F.2d 843 (2d
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1259 (1984); Republic Indus., Inc. v. Teamsters Joint
Council No. 83 Pension Fund, 718 F.2d 628 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1259
(1984).
40. The courts which have addressed constitutional challenges to the MPPAA's
decisionmaking scheme on procedural due process grounds have failed to address ade
quately this issue. In Fulton, 762 F.2d 1137, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
summarily stated that the trustees' role was not adjudicative, but ministerial because they
must apply one of four calculation methods provided in the statute. Id. at 1141-42. The
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Yahn, 787 F.2d 128, offered similar condusory
statements and even contradicted itself in describing the trustees' role. The court's discus
sion of the issue, appearing only in footnotes, at one point rejected the First Circuit Court
of Appeals' contention that the trustees' role was ministerial, id. at 141 n.18, but later in the
opinion argued that the trustees' role was not adjudicative to support its reasoning for
severing a portion of the statute. Id. at 143 n.23. The court did not analyze the calculation
procedure to determine the nature of the trustees' role, but only stated conclusions about
the process. See also Standard Dye, 725 F.2d at 855; RepUblic, 718 F.2d at 640 n.13.
41. L. MODJESKA, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4.10
(1982). See also J. STEIN, G. MITCHELL & B. MEZINES, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
§ 33.01[2] (1986) (informal and formal adjudications are governed by the requirements of
due process and formal adjudications require full trial type hearings).
42. C. KOCH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 7.1 (1985) ("[I]t has been
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The decision making process of the MPPAA is a hybrid, and not
exclusively adjudicative or legislative. Two of the classic distinctions
between adjudication and rulemaking-the time frame and subject
matter of the decision-cut in different directions. Under temporal
dimensions, "a rule prescribes future patterns of conduct; a decision
determines liabilities upon the basis of present or past facts."43 Look
ing at whether the decisionmaking process and decision affect particu
lar individuals or individuals in the abstract, the established doctrine is
that "[r]ulemaking affects the rights of individuals in the abstract and
must be applied in a further proceeding before the legal position of any
particular individual will be definitely affected; adjudication operates
concretely upon individuals in their individual capacity."44
An examination of the MPPAA's decisionmaking process for de
termining withdrawal liability reveals elements of both adjUdication
and rulemaking. The first decision, the selection of a particular
method for calculating withdrawal liability under 29 U.S.c. § 1391, is
a rulemaking process. It is future-oriented and concerns all employ
ers, subsequent withdrawing employers as well as the specific with
drawing employer.45 The determination concerns "individuals in the
abstract,"46 and may affect employers unknown at the time the policy
is implemented. In contrast, however, the second step of the process,
decisions on the termination date and adoption of the specific actuarial
assumptions, focus on the particular withdrawing employer and are
specific to the employer in its "individual capacity."47 The date of
termination is dependent on historical facts concerning the employers'
conduct and status. The actuarial assumptions are based on specific
information about the actual employees of the withdrawing em
ployer-their ages and work histories, for example-for use in estab
long accepted that due process does not apply to rulemaking."). See also B. SCHWARTZ,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 4.8 (2d ed. 1984) ("Agencies engaged in rulemaking are, as a
general proposition, no more subject to constitutional procedural requirements than is the
legislature engaged in enacting a statute. ").
43. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 42, at § 4.2 (emphasis in original). See also S. BREYER
& R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 398 (1979)
("Rulemaking consists in the promulgation of generally applicable requirements or stan
dards governing future conduct. Adjudication consists in determining the legal conse
quences of past events in a particular controversy between specific parties.").
44. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 42, at § 4.2. See also K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TEXT § 5.01 (3d ed. 1972) ("[R]ulemaking should be defined as the 'issuance of regu
lations or making of determinations which are addressed to indicated but unnamed and
unspecified persons or situations.' " (citing Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Rule-Mak
ing, 52 HARV. L. REV. 259, 265 (1938))).
45. See supra notes 23 & 43 and accompanying text.
46. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
47. See supra notes 24-29 & 44 and accompanying text.
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lishing mortality rates and retirement ages. 48
The MPP AA's decisionmaking process for calculation of with
drawal liability is in part adjudicative and in part legislative. Because
the adjudicative aspects are the centerpiece of the employer challenges
and figure so prominently in the imposition of significant liability,49
the courts should regard the MPP AA's decisionmaking process as ad
judicatory. The threshold decision then entitles the employers to pro
tection of their fifth amendment procedural due process rights before
they can be deprived of their property.
As mentioned above, all of the courts which addressed the consti
tutionality of the MPP AA's decisionmaking procedure assumed some
protection for the employers, but none of the courts fully explicated
the basis for that protection. The courts assumed that some due pro
cess was due, and then evaluated whether the protection for the em
ployers under the decisionmaking scheme of the MPP AA was
constitutionally sufficient. The note now turns to an examination of
those decisions.

B.

Opinions Sustaining the MPPAA's Decisionmaking Process

1.

Republic Industries, Inc. v. Teamsters Joint Council No. 83
Pension Fund 50

The constitutional challenge to the decisionmaking process of the
MPP AA first arose as a secondary issue in this case, whose primary
attack was on the Act's retroactive application. 51 The Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals' discussion of the employer's decisionmaker bias
48. See supra notes 27 & 43 and accompanying text. Another factor-the interest
rate assumption-is also future-oriented to a certain degree because the future economic
climate must be predicted. However, this future-oriented evaluation is specific to each with
drawing employer at the time of its withdrawal from the plan.
49. See supra notes 27 & 216.
50. 718 F.2d 628 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1259 (1984). Republic
Industries was the successor in interest to Johnson Motor Lines, Inc. (a motor carrier of
freight). After operating at a loss, forcing it to close a terminal, Republic terminated
Johnson's operations and ceased contributing to Johnson's pension plan. The trustees
assessed Johnson a withdrawal liability of $189,107.00. Following some debate as to
whether Johnson should receive special treatment as a trucking business under 29 U.S.C.
§ 1383(d) (1982) (this section is a special provision controlling the amount and terms of
withdrawal liability payments for employers primarily engaged in the trucking business),
the trustees concluded that Johnson was not in the trucking business and, thereafter,
demanded payment. Republic refused to make the payments as successor in interest, and
filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the MPPAA. Republic, 718 F.2d at 633.
51. See id. at 631. The court held that the retroactive application was constitutional
as Congress chose an equitable and rational solution to help ensure the financial stability of
multiemployer pension plans.
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claim was brief. 52 Republic claimed that an "institutional bias"53 on
the part of the trustees, compounded by the presumption of correct
ness which attached to their findings, deprived it of its due process
right to a fair and impartial decisionmaker. 54 The trustees' bias, ac
cording to Republic, was manifested in large withdrawal liability
which ensured the solvency of the plan. 55 The large liability enabled
employees and retirees to receive their benefits and reduce the financial
liability of the other employers supporting the plan.
Relying on the Supreme Court's holding in Mathews v. El
dridge,56 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Republic's ar
guments. In Mathews, the Court discussed the procedures
constitutionally required before termination of social security bene
fits. 57 The Court established a balancing test to determine the necessity
of a hearing before the termination of the benefits. The test considers
the following three factors: (1) the private interest affected by the offi
cial action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of the private interest
and the probable value of additional safeguards; and (3) the govern
ment's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and ad
ministrative burden of additional safeguards. 58
Although the court in Republic did not articulate and, arguably,
did not in fact consider the Mathews interests,59 it rejected Republic's
52. Id. at 639-41.
53. The court noted that the allegations of trustee bias were simply "generalized
assumptions of possible interest." Id. at 640 n.I3. Republic claimed the bias was a result of
the fiduciary duty which the trustees owed to the plan under 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1982).
Republic, 718 F.2d. at 640.
54. Id. at 640-41.
55. Id. at 640.
56. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). In this case, Eldridge had been receiving Social Security
disability benefits beginning in 1968. After a review of medical reports and a questionnaire
filled out by Eldridge, the state agency monitoring his condition determined that Eldridge's
disability had ceased in 1972. The Social Security Administration accepted the agency's
findings and discontinued the benefits. Eldridge filed an action claiming a right to an evi
dentiary hearing prior to the termination of welfare benefits.
57. Id. at 323.
58. Id. at 335. In applying this test in the Mathews case, the Court balanced: (I) the
private interest of "uninterrupted receipt" of welfare benefits "pending final administrative
decision of his claim;" (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation in a process using medical
assessments by the recipient's doctor, a detailed questionnaire completed by the recipient,
with the assistance of the local social security office, if necessary, and full access by the
recipient to all information relied on by the state agency; and (3) the public interest of the
"administrative burden" and other "societal costs" associated with a constitutional right to
an evidentiary hearing prior to termination of welfare benefits. The Court decided that the
existing process was sufficient for due process purposes. Id. at 340-47.
59. Because the Republic court did not articulate the interests to be balanced under
the Mathews test and did not overtly conduct a balancing analysis, the court may not have
applied the Mathews test.
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arguments. The Republic court found no inherent bias on the part of
the trustees, stating that their fiduciary status, in and of itself, was not
a "per se" violation of due process. 60 The Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit went on to say that the trustees were necessary in the
decisionmaking process because of their expertise in the area. 61
The court also noted that the trustees did not have "unbridled
discretion" in their decisionmaking. The statute required the trustees
to use one of four prescribed methods in computing withdrawalliabil
ity62 and to apply their chosen method uniformly to future withdrawal
liability assessments, which would affect their employer if it later with
drew. 63 Finally, the court in Republic rejected the argument that the
presumption of correctness compounded any partiality in the trustees'
determinations, stating that the findings were subject to arbitrational
and judicial review. 64 In the opinion of Chief Judge Winter, the pre
sumption merely shifted the burden of proof to the challenger. 65
2.

Textile Workers Pension Fund v. Standard Dye
& Finishing, Co. 66

In the Standard Dye cases,67 the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit addressed the employer's due process right to a fair and impar
tial hearing,68 again as a secondary issue to the primary challenge to
the retroactive application of the MPPAA.69 The court in Standard
Dye reviewed the employer's due process claim using the Mathews bal
ancing test, and, unlike the Republic court,70 articulated the interests
60. Republic, 718 F.2d at 640.
61. [d.
62. See supra note 22 and accompanying text for discussion of the methods.
63. RepUblic, 718 F.2d at 640-41. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
64. [d. at 641.
65. [d. In support of this view, the court cited an amicus brief which listed cases in
which the employer prevailed in arbitration. [d. at n.14.
66. 725 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1259 (1984). Standard Dye &
Finishing Co. processed and distributed dye and textiles. Beginning in 1961, it contributed
to a pension fund pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement with the Textile Workers
Union of America. In 1980, Standard Dye was forced to liquidate its assets of one million
dollars as the costs of business became too great to pass on to consumers. After liquidation,
the plan notified Standard Dye that it calculated a withdrawal liability of $817,398.00.
Standard Dye refused to pay and the plan filed this action.
67. The other case consolidated with Standard Dye was Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co.
v. Bakery, Confectionery and Tobacco Workers Int'l Union, 566 F. Supp. 32 (W.D.N.Y.
1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1259 (1984). After going out of business in 1980, Sibley began
making withdrawal payments, but later challenged the MPPAA's constitutionality.
68. Standard Dye, 725 F.2d at 854-55.
69. [d. at 845.
70. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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to be balanced. 71 The court determined that no hearing was required
prior to the payment of the assessed withdrawal liability. 72
Judge Cardamone's opinion then examined the rationality of in
volving the plan's trustees in the decisionmaking process and attaching
a presumption of correctness to their findings. The court rejected the
notion of inherent trustee bias and distinguished the case of Ward v.
Monroeville,73 on which the employer had relied. In Ward, a mayor
served as a trier of certain ordinance and traffic offenses, and the fines
from convictions generated substantial income to the village. 74 The
Court found that this structure violated the procedural due process
right to a fair and impartial hearing. 75
The court in Standard Dye distinguished its case from Ward on
the basis that the trustees were required by law to serve the fund im
partially and were restricted in their discretion to determine with
drawal liability. 76 The court also rejected the employer's argument
that the presumption in favor of the trustees' findings was unconstitu
tional, citing Republic's reasoning that the findings were subject to re
view by an arbitrator and, if necessary, the courts. 77
71. Standard Dye, 725 F.2d at 854. Under the Mathews test the court articulated the
following interests to be balanced: (1) private interest-the court classified the private in
terest as the employers' bank account, as payment deprives the employer of the use of the
liability payment funds; (2) risk of erroneous deprivation-the court stated any erroneous
deprivation due to improper liability assessment would be temporary, as the employer
would be refunded monies improperly appropriated to the fund. Also, the probable value
of the additional safeguard of a full hearing prior to payment was minimal as the employer
could provide the plan with information or point out inaccuracies in the trustees' determi
nation; and (3) public interests-the public interest is that of protecting multiemployer
pension plans and the employees and retirees protected by those plans. See supra note 58.
72. The court determined from the balancing test that a hearing prior to payment of
withdrawal liability was unnecessary and that the review of the trustees' findings was suffi
cient to protect the employers' due process interests.
73. 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
74. Id. at 58.
75. Id. at 60. In reaching this conclusion, the opinion cited Turney v. Ohio, 273 U.S.
510 (1927), in which the Court held that it violated due process to have a judge decide a
case if he had a "direct, personal or substantial pecuniary interest" in the outcome of that
case. Id. at 523. In Ward the Court held that the judge had such an interest and, therefore,
could not provide the impartiality required by the procedural due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.
76. Standard Dye, 725 F.2d at 855. In describing the trustees as impartial, the court
ignored 29 U.S.c. § ll04(a) (1982). This section requires that the fiduciaries of the fund
(the trustees) discharge their duties solely in the interest of the plan's participants and bene
ficiaries and for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants and beneficiaries.
29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(7) & (8) (1982) defines participants as employees or former employees
and defines beneficiaries as persons designated by employees.
77. Standard Dye, 725 F.2d at 855. See Republic, 718 F.2d at 641-42 ("We reject
Republic's [the employer's] argument that such review is essentially meaningless.").
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Washington Star Co. v. International Typographical Union
Negotiated Pension Plan 78

In the due process section of the Washington Star decision,79 the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit cited Republic
and largely reiterated the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit's
reasoning. The court stated that although the trustees have a fiduciary
duty to the plan's participants and beneficiaries, they harbor no inher
ent bias. 80 The court did add its own elaboration that the spirit of the
legislative history of the MPP AA required the trustees to act neutrally
and reasonably and thus guaranteed a fair and impartial review. 8l The
court dismissed Washington Star's argument that the presumption of
correctness was unconstitutional by reasoning that the presumption
did not insulate the trustees, but required them to provide evidence to
support their findings if the employer introduced contrary evidence. 82

4.

Board of Trustees of the Western Conference of Teamsters
Pension Trust Fund v. Thompson Building Materials, Inc. 83

In Thompson Building, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir
cuit reviewed a broad constitutional attack on the MPPAA. 84 In deal
78. 729 F.2d 1502 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement,
the Washington Star contributed to the International Typographical Union Negotiated
Pension Plan. In 1981, however, financial difficulties forced the Star to cease its operations
and dismiss all of its employees. The plan notified the Star of its assessed withdrawal
liability of $525,987.00, which the Star did not dispute. The Star made the first two
required quarterly payments, but then withheld the third payment and filed this action
challenging the MPPAA's constitutionality.
79. Again, the Washington Star case was primarily a challenge to the retroactive
application of the MPPAA. Id. at 1508. However, in addition to the decisionmaking pro
cess of the Act, the Star also attacked the MPPAA on the basis that it violated the Contract
Clause of the Constitution by superceding the collective bargaining agreement which pro
vided for payment of benefits. The court rejected this argument stating that Congress was
within its power to pass legislation adjusting economic benefits and burdens, and the inci
dental upset expectations of employers were subject to Congress' exercise of this power. Id.
80. Id. at 1511.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. 749 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985). Thompson
had contributed to a pension plan as required by a collective bargaining agreement. In
1980, the union notified Thompson that it would no longer represent Thompson's
employees so Thompson ceased contributing. The plan then notified Thompson that it
owed $103,156.52 as a withdrawal liability. Thompson demanded arbitration, but did not
follow the procedures to initiate it. Thompson also did not pay the liability and the plan
initiated this action.
84. Thompson claimed that the MPPAA was unconstitutional in that it: (1) im
paired contractual relations; (2) denied the right to an impartial tribunal; (3) denied the
right to a meaningful hearing; (4) denied access to the courts; and (5) constituted a taking
without just compensation. The court rejected all of these challenges. Id. at 1399.
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ing with the procedural due process challenge, the court followed the
reasoning of the Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fourth and Dis
trict of Columbia Circuits and upheld the Act's constitutionality.85
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found the trustees' duties to be
mostly ministerial, reducing the effect of any bias, and determined that
any bias was outweighed by the expertise the trustees brought to the
decisionmaking process. 86 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals also
agreed with the other three circuits that the presumption of correct
ness of the trustees' findings was rational and that the statute appro
priately cabined the trustees' discretion in making their
determinations. 87
5.

Keith Fulton & Sons, Inc. v. New England Teamsters &
Trucking Industry Pension Fund, Inc. 88

There are actually two Fulton cases. In the initial Fulton case
(Fulton 1), a panel of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit found
that the presumption afforded the trustees' findings violated the em
ployer's due process right. 89 After en banc review,90 the First Circuit
Court of Appeals vacated the panel's opinion and entered a decision
upholding the constitutionality of the MPPAA (Fulton II).91
Fulton II was a direct attack on the MPPAA's decisionmaking
process, rather than a broad challenge to the Act with the procedural
due process claim raised only as a subsidiary issue. In Fulton II, the
employer's argument, simply stated, was that the trustees' determina
tion of withdrawal liability was a violation of procedural due process
because the trustees were naturally inclined to maximize liability in
order to increase the plan's assets.92 Fulton argued that the presump
85. Id. at 1403.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. 762 F.2d 1137 (1st Cir. 1985). Fulton initiated this case after it refused to pay its
assessed withdrawal liability. Fulton was a heavy equipment hauler and railroad car
unloader. In 1980, the City of Cambridge, Massachusetts acquired Fulton's lalld by
eminent domain. After an unsuccessful search for a new location, Fulton ceased
operations. Fulton withdrew from the pension plan to which it had been contributing
pursuant to collective bargaining agreements. The plan assessed Fulton's withdrawal
liability at $468,637.00, which Fulton refused to pay.
89. Keith Fulton & Sons, Inc. v. New England Teasmsters & Trucking Indus. Pen
sion Fund, Inc., 762 F.2d 1124, 1135 (1st Cir. 1984). This successful, albeit short-lived,
constitutional challenge to the MPPAA is discussed in the next section of this note.
90. The First Circuit Court of Appeals agreed to review the case en bane because the
panel's determination that the MPPAA was partly unconstitutional was a departure from
all previous holdings on the issue. Fulton, 762 F.2d 1137, 1138-39.
91. Id. at 1139.
92. Id.
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tion of correctness afforded the findings compounded this violation. 93
The First Circuit Court of Appeals began its analysis by stating
three principles which would inform its review of the MPPAA. First,
citing a principle from Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 94 the
court stated that:
[i]t is by now well established that legislative Acts adjusting the bur
dens and benefits of economic life come to the Court with a pre
sumption of constitutionality, and that the burden is on one
complaining of a due process violation to establish that the legisla
ture has acted in an arbitrary and irrational way.95
In addition to the view that the MPPAA should receive deferential
treatment,96 the court identified the Mathews balancing test as the ap
propriate standard for determining the constitutional sufficiency of the
decisionmaking process under the MPPAA.97 Finally, the court
stated its consciousness of the fact that "due process is flexible and
calls for such procedural protection as the particular situation
demands."98
The First Circuit Court of Appeals' review centered not on
whether there might be a fairer decisionmaking process, but whether
Congress' prescribed method was "fair enough. "99 In keeping with
this standard, the majority in Fulton II conceded that the trustees ac
ted with an inherent bias and that the statutory presumption, in fact,
compounded this bias. loo However, the court held that the partiality
of the decisionmaking process did not exceed the limits of due
process. 101
The First Circuit Court of Appeals departed from the reasoning
of other courts by finding that the trustees harbored an inherent bias
against the employers.102 After conceding the existence of bias, the
Id.
94. 428 u.s. 1 (1976).
95. Fulton II, 762 F.2d 1137, 1140 (quoting Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co.,
428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976» (citations omitted).
96. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
97. Fulton II, 762 F.2d 1137, 1140.
98. Id. (citing Republic, 718 F.2d at 640 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
481 (1972»).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. The court simply held that Congress acted within its discretion.
102. No inherent bias was found in Washington Star Co. v. International Typo
graphical Union Negotiated Pension Plan, 729 F.2d 1502, 1511 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Textile
Workers Pension Fund v. Standard Dye & Finishing Co., 725 F.2d 843, 855 (2d Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1259 (1984); Republic Indus., Inc. v. Teamsters Joint Council No. 83
Pension Fund, 718 F.2d 628, 640-41 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1259 (1984). But
93.
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majority in Fulton II discounted this inherent bias for several reasons.
First, the court looked to the requirement that the method chosen for
calculating liability must be applied uniformly to subsequent with
drawing employers.103 This requirement, the court reasoned, would
dissuade the trustees from applying a method that resulted in high
withdrawal liabilities, for fear that the method would subsequently be
applied to the employer that appointed them. 104
Second, the court claimed that the trustees' fiduciary obligation to
the plan did not necessarily mean that they would assess the highest
possible liability.105 Their fiduciary duty in fact prohibited such ac
tion, because high assessments would discourage future participation
in the plan by other employers and thereby undermine the strength of
the entire system. 106
The court also found the Ward holding inapplicable. In the First
Circuit Court of Appeals' view the trustees were acting not as adjudi
cators as in Ward, but as administrators. 107 The majority stated that
the trustees did not have unbridled discretion, but rather had to make
their calculations according to the detailed provisions of the statute,
which reduced the influence of any inherent bias. IDS
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit also rejected Fulton's
argument that the presumption afforded the trustees' decisions vio
lated procedural due process. The majority accepted the plan's argu
ment that placing the burden of proof on the employer was a necessary
corollary of allowing a number of different methods for calculating
liability. 109 The court cited a House Report illustrating this view:
"These rules are necessary in order to ensure the enforcability [sic] of
employer liability. In the absence of these presumptions, employers
could effectively nullify their obligation by refusing to pay and forcing
the plan sponsor to prove every element involved in making an actua
see Board of Trustees of the W. Conference of Teamsters Pension Fund, Inc. v. Thompson
Bldg. Materials, Inc., 749 F.2d 1396, 1403 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054
(1985) (alluded to existence of inherent bias).
103. Fulton II, 762 F.2d 1137, 1142. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
104. Fulton II, 762 F.2d 1137, 1142. The employee organization and the employers
collectively must be represented equally on the board of trustees. Therefore, one half of the
trustees are appointed by the employers. See supra notes 19 & 20.
105. Fulton II, 762 F.2d 113;, 1142.
106. [d. at 1142-43.
107. [d. at 1141-42. The Fulton II court agreed with the Republic court that the
trustees' task was "ministerial." Id.
108. [d. at 1141.
109. [d. at 1143-44.
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rial determination." 110 Thus, without the presumptions, the statute
would encourage employers to initiate litigation to determine whether
the method chosen was one of the many reasonable methods permitted
by the ACt. 111
To illustrate its conclusion that the presumptions were valid, the
court stated that Congress itself could have chosen to require the use
of the calculation method that produced the highest withdrawalliabil
ity, rather than to permit the choice of several reasonable methods. I 12
Since Congress had the constitutional authority to require this
method, it a fortiori had the authority to allow trustees to choose a
method and to afford their choice a presumption of reasonableness. I 13
In summary, while Fulton II was in accord with the Second,
Fourth, Ninth and District of Columbia Circuit Courts of Appeals in
upholding the constitutionality of the MPPAA, the First Circuit
Court of Appeals qualified its endorsement of the propriety of the Act.
Where the other circuits expounded on the neutrality of the trust
ees, 114 the Fulton II court recognized the trustees' bias but minimized
its effect and legal significance.
The majority in Fulton II twice expressed the view that while
they did not believe the statute exceeded the requirements of proce
dural due process, they also did not believe that Congress had chosen
the "best" 115 or "fairest""6 process for determining withdrawalliabil
ity. This uneasiness with Congress' legislative scheme was expressed
110. Id. at 1143 (citing H.R. REP. No. 869, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 67, 86, reprinted in
1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2935, 2954).
Ill. See Fulton II, 762 F.2d 1137, 1143.
112. Id. at 1143-44.
113. Id. This part of the court's opinion confuses substantive due process with pro
cedural due process. See infra notes 154-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Fulton II court's confusion of these types of due process.
114. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
115. Fulton II, 762 F.2d 1137, 1144. The court stated:
Our rejection of Fulton's argument does not mean that we believe Congress
picked the best method for ascertaining an employer's withdrawal liability ....
Finding the best method, however, is not our function; under the due process
precedents which guide us, we must only find that Congress acted rationally in
designing the procedure for calculating withdrawal liability.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Again, the court confused substantive and procedural due process analysis here. See
infra notes 154-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of this confusion.
116. Fulton II, 762 F.2d 1137, 1146 ("Although we concede that Congress may not
have prescribed the fairest plan for assessing withdrawal liability, our review of the statute
in light of the standard of due process convinces us that the provisions of 29 U.S.c. §
140I(a)(3) are not constitutionally deficient.").
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emphatically in the opinions of the majority in Fulton 1,117 Judge Al
drich's dissent in Fulton II, 118 and finally in Yahn,119 holding the deci
sionmaking process of the MPPAA unconstitutional.
C.

Opinions Invalidating the MPPAA's Decisionmaking Process

1. Keith Fulton & Sons, Inc. v. New England Teamsters &
Trucking Industry Pension Fund, Inc. 120

Fulton I was a sweeping constitutional challenge to the MPPAA
and, as in all of the cases challenging the MPPAA which preceded it,
the procedural due process claim was one of the subsidiary issues.121
In Fulton I, the employer claimed that the presumption of correctness
afforded the trustees' findings, in combination with "the lack of preci
sion in the actuarial art and the fact that the trustees have a fiduciary
duty to the fund," led to the assessment of the highest possible with
drawalliability.122 Fulton argued, and the panel agreed, that this pro
cedure violated the employers' fifth amendment right to due
process. 123
The First Circuit Court of Appeals panel in Fulton 1124 began its
analysis of the procedural due process claim with a discussion of the
presumption of correctness afforded the trustees' findings. The court
noted the "rather unique" nature of this scheme and drew compari
sons to normal civil and criminal suits in which the party desiring a
change in the status quo must prove the "existence of liability" and the
117. Keith Fulton & Sons, Inc. v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pen
sion Fund, Inc. 762 F.2d 1124 (1st Cir. 1984). The Fulton II opinion vacated this decision.
Fulton II, 762 F.2d 1137, 1146.
1I8. Id. at 1I46-SI (Aldrich, J., dissenting).
1I9. United Retail & Wholesale Employees Teamsters Union Local 1I5 Pension
Plan v. Yahn & McDonnell, Inc., 787 F.2d 128 (3d Cir. 1986),prob.juris. noted, 107 S. Ct.
567 (1986).
120. 762 F.2d 1124 (1st Cir. 1984). See supra note 88 for a discussion of the facts
surrounding Fulton's withdrawal.
121. Id. at 1127-37. Fulton challenged the MPPAA on the following grounds: (1) it
violated substantive due process rights; more specifically, it violated the contract clause and
did not pass constitutional muster under a "rational basis" test; (2) it denied the seventh
amendment right of trial by jury; (3) it denied the fifth amendment right of access to the
courts; (4) it violated procedural due process in the presumption of correctness afforded the
trustees' findings; (5) it constituted a deprivation of property without a prompt hearing;
(6) it constituted an unconstitutional taking of property, and; (7) its retroactive application
was unconstitutional.
122. Id. at 1133.
123. Id.
124. Senior District Judge Pettine, of the District of Rhode Island, sitting by
designation, wrote the Fulton I decision.
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"extent of that liability" by at least a preponderance of the evidence. 125
By contrast, under the MPPAA, once the existence of liability is estab
lished, the burden of proof is shifted from the party trying to change
the status quo (i.e., the plan trying to take something from the em
ployer) to the employer, who must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the extent of liability is unreasonable or erroneous. 126 If
the arbitrator then agrees with the plan as to the extent of liability, the
employer must prove in court, by a clear preponderance of the evi
dence, that the finding was "clearly erroneous."127 The statute's effect
then, is to permit the trustees to select any liability that is not "clearly
erroneous," a range of possibilities that spans tens of thousands of
dollars. 128
These presumptions were especially troubling to the panel be
cause the trustees are not neutral and detached. 129 Analogizing the
fiduciary duty owed by the trustees to the plan, to the role of the
mayor in Ward v. Monroeville,I3O the court stated:
Consistently picking the highest possible figure for withdrawal lia
bility would best fulfill their fiduciary duties to the fund and the
covered employees, besides fulfilling any fiduciary duties which may
or may not exist vis-a-vis non-withdrawing employers .... With
drawal liability . . . gives the trustees not only a chance to punish
the withdrawing employer but also a chance to deter further with
drawals through the imposition of the highest possible liability,l3l

In the light of these defects in the scheme, the panel of the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit held the MPPAA's decisionmaking pro
cess for establishing withdrawal liability unconstitutional.
In rejecting the validity and necessity of trustees' involvement
and the presumption that attached to trustees' decisions, the court
summarized its view of due process: "Fair procedures are rarely as
economical as summary ones. However, society's interest in funda
mental fairness is greater than its interest in reducing the legal fees
125. Fulton I, 762 F.2d 1124, 1133-34.
126. See id.; 29 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(3)(B) (1982).
127. See Fulton I, 762 F.2d 1124, 1134; 29 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(3)(A) (1982).
128. Fulton I, 762 F.2d 1124, 1134. In Yahn. the court stated that the trustees, in
deciding Fulton's withdrawal liability, set a discount rate at 7.5%, but noted that a dis
count rate of 14.5% also would have been reasonable. Yahn, 787 F.2d at 140. The court
stated that the difference in money between the withdrawal liabilities using these two dis
count rates was "considerable." Id. See also supra note 27 & infra note 216.
129. See Fulton I, 762 F.2d 1124, 1134.
130. 409 U.S. 57 (1972). See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text for discussion
of the facts and holding in Ward.
131. Fulton I, 762 F.2d 1124, 1134.
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paid by pension funds."132 To cure the constitutional defect in the
MPPAA, the court severed from the statute the clause providing for
the presumptions. The court cited numerous authorities for this ac
tion,133 and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit later used this
procedure in Yahn. 134
2.

Judge Aldrich's Dissent in Fulton IIl3S

When the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld the MP
PAA in Fulton II, Judge Aldrich filed a dissenting opinion. He began
his opinion with a discussion of the factual background of the case to
highlight the inequities created by the MPPAA. Judge Aldrich
pointed out that Fulton became a withdrawing employer after being
forced out of business when the city took land vital to the company's
existence by eminent domain. 136 Thus, through no fault of its own,
Fulton was forced out of business and forced to make liability
payments. 137
Judge Aldrich then expanded on the inherent bias of the plans'
trustees. He explained that the bias was based both on a fiduciary
duty, as the majority conceded,138 and on the trustees' personal cir
cumstances. Judge Aldrich said:
[T]he trustees have personal interests in their decision beyond
avoiding being charged for misfeasance. If, as the court suggests,
they look ahead to possible future withdrawals on their own part,
obviously the more solvent they make the fund today, at the with
drawing employer's expense, the smaller the possible deficit they
will be personally responsible for in the future. Even if they do not
contemplate future withdrawal, augmenting the fund's assets today
could avert possible future pressure on them to increase contribu
tions to meet unfunded liability. 139

Judge Aldrich also attacked the argument that the trustees would
132. Id. at 1135.
133. The First Circuit Court of Appeals cited Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976),
for the authority to sever 29 U.S.c. § 1401(a)(3) from the MPPAA. Buckley provided
that, .. 'Unless it is evident that the Legislature would not have enacted those provisions
which are within its power, independently of that which is not, the invalid part may be
dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law.''' Buckley, 424 U.S. at 108 (quoting
Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932».
134. Yahn, 787 F.2d at 143.
135. Fulton II, 762 F.2d 1137, 1146-51 (Aldrich, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 1147. See supra note 88 for full discussion of the facts in Fulton.
137. Fulton II, 762 F.2d 1137, 1147 (Aldrich, J., dissenting).
138. See id. at 1142.
139. Id. at 1148 (Aldrich, J., dissenting).
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not set high withdrawal liability for fear of scaring off potential con
tributing employers. In his view, increasing the fund's solvency
through high withdrawal liability payments makes the plan more, not
less, attractive to potential employers. 140 To the extent that this is ac
curate, the trustees have an incentive, and not a disincentive, to im
pose high withdrawal rates.
Judge Aldrich also made an issue of the flaw in the majority's
reasoning process in the portion of the decision discussing the trustees'
purported lack of discretion. 141 The majority stated that the trustees
primarily were performing a ministerial role in applying the calcula
tion methods, and hence their discretion was narrow. 142 However, the
opinion later argued that the trustees' decisions must be afforded a
presumption of correctness in order to avoid litigation because of the
wide range of possible results from the various actuarial methods. 143
Judge Aldrich pointed out that the trustees' role should not be consid
ered ministerial because their employment of different actuarial meth
ods had such wide ranging results, as conceded by the majority.l44
Finally, Judge Aldrich challenged the argument that because
Congress could have passed an act that required the highest with
drawal liability, the flexible statutory scheme was constitutional. 145
He stated that if Congress had so acted and satisfied the standard of
reasonableness, its action would have been the decision of a majority
of impartial legislators. 146 However, according to Judge Aldrich, the
delegation of that type of discretion to biased decisionmakers is funda
mentally different and improper. 147
In his conclusion, Judge Aldrich recommended a cure for the de
fective decisionmaking procedure of the MPPAA. Judge Aldrich rec
ommended that Congress amend the Act and substitute an impartial
decisionmaker to calculate withdrawal liability.148 Pending such ac
tion, he would eliminate the presumption in favor of the trustees. 149
While failing to convince a majority of the First Circuit Court of Ap
peals, Judge Aldrich's arguments and proposals found a more sympa
thetic ear in the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The Court of
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 1150.
See id. at 1149.
Id. at 1142.
See id. at 1143.
Id. at 1149 (Aldrich, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1151.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Appeals for the Third Circuit in Yahn ruled that the withdrawalliabil
ity decisionmaking process was unconstitutional and severed the pre
sumption provisions from the statute. ISO

3.

United Retail & Wholesale Employees Teamsters Union Local
155 Pension Plan v. Yahn & McDonnell, Inc. lSI

Yahn raised three questions involving the MPPAA, one of which
was the constitutionality of the decisionmaking process for determin
ing withdrawal liability.152 In discussing the procedural due process
challenge to the MPPAA, the court extensively analyzed the reason
ing of the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Fulton II and adopted
much of the reasoning in Judge Aldrich's dissent. ls3
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals began its analysis by defining
the appropriate standard of review for this type of procedural due pro
cess claim. It sharply criticized the Fulton II court for invoking the
Turner Elkhorn principle that legislative acts adjusting economic ben
efits and burdens will not be overturned unless it can be shown that
Congress acted arbitrarily or irrationally.ls4 The Yahn court pointed
out that Turner Elkhorn is applicable to substantive due process
claims, not procedural due process claims. ISS While the Turner Elk
150. Yahn, 787 F.2d at 130.
151. 787 F.2d 128 (3d Cir. 1986),prob.juris. noted, 107 S. Ct. 567 (1986). Yahn &
McDonnell, Inc. began contributing to the Local 115 pension fund in 1980. In 1981, Yahn
ceased operations and withdrew from the plan. The plan assessed Yahn a withdrawal
liability of $458,000.00 Yahn requested and received a review of the assessment, but it was
not altered. Pending arbitration, the plan brought an action demanding payment of the
withdrawal liability by Yahn.
152. Id. at 129. Yahn also questioned whether the MPPAA authorized a right of
action to collect withdrawal liability payments pending arbitration. The third question
concerning the MPPAA was whether the MPPAA required an award of attorney's fees,
liquidated damages, and costs upon entry of a judgment in favor of the plan for delinquent
payments.
153. See id. at 135-42.
154. Id. at 137. In Turner Elkhorn, the Court upheld a federal law that contained an
"irrebuttable presumption" of total disability for miners seeking compensation who had
been diagnosed as extremely ill with pneumoconiosis as a result of their coal mining. Tur
ner Elkhorn, 428 U.S. at 22-24. The constitutional challenge in Turner Elkhorn involved a
substantive provision of the statute rather than a procedural one. The Supreme Court
stated that since there was a rational relation between the fact presumed and the ultimate
fact proved, the presumption was valid. Id. at 28.
155. Yahn, 787 F.2d at 137. The Yahn court was correct in pointing out that this
substantive analysis is inapplicable to procedural due process claims. Professor Tribe has
stated the well-settled view that substantive and procedural due process analyses are dis
tinct from each other. He has pointed out that the government can decide what substantive
benefits to provide to the people, but there is a separate inquiry into the fairness of the
procedure for the withdrawal of those benefits. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU
TIONAL LAW 506 (1978). See also, Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SUP. CT.
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horn test may determine whether Congress chose a reasonable sub
stantive rule, it does not determine whether the procedure is adequate
or fair.ls6
The majority in Yahn also drew a distinction between two types
of procedural due process claims: those arising from insufficient pro
cedural safeguards, and those arising from decisionmaker bias. 157
Based on this distinction, the court determined that reliance on the
Mathews balancing test was also inappropriate. ISS The Court of Ap
peals for the Third Circuit pointed out that the Mathews Court did not
discuss the procedural due process right to an unbiased decisionmaker
and on subsequent occasions the Supreme Court has not invoked the
balancing test in such cases. IS9 The court stated:
[T]he Mathews balancing test is not the proper inquiry. If someone
is deprived of his right to an impartial tribunal, then he is denied his
constitutional right to due process, regardless of the magnitude of
the individual and state interests at stake, the risk of error and the
likely value of additional safeguards (the factors to be balanced
under Mathews). 160

Having eliminated the previous methods for reviewing this proce
dural due process challenge to the MPPAA, the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit began its own review. The court recognized the
trustees' inherent bias, as in Fulton II, and rejected the argument that
the bias was discounted by "allegiance" to withdrawing employers and
a fiduciary duty to the fund. 161 Citing NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 162 the
REV. 85, 88 (while review of substantive law is most often done under lenient standards,
procedural review affords very little deference to the legislature); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,71
(1966) (Harlan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("The substantive-procedural di
chotomy is ... an indispensible tool of analysis. . .. Its premise is ultimately that courts
may not substitute for the judgments of legislators their own understanding of the public
welfare, but must instead concern themselves with the validity under the Constitution of
the methods which the legislature has selected. ").
156. See Yahn, 787 F.2d at 137 (citing Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188 (1982);
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976».
157. /d. at 137.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 137-38.
160. Id. at 138.
161. See id. To support its rejection of the argument that the bias was discounted,
the Yahn court suggested that the Supreme Court would regard the trustees in this case as
biased, in view of other cases in which the Supreme Court found no bias. One such case is
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. I (1979) (rejecting optometrist's claim that Texas Optometry
Disciplining Board was biased because the plaintiff failed to show the possibility of personal
interest of the board members that would preclude a fair hearing). See a/so, Schweiker v.
McClure, 456 U.S. 188 (1982) (upholding Medicare program in which final decision by
approved insurance carrier, denying payment of patient's insurance benefits, was conducted
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court argued that the trustees owed an "exclusive" duty to the plan, 163
and were personally liable to the plan for any breach of that duty. 164
This combination of statutory duty and personal interest created a
procedure arguably less impartial than the one used in Ward, where
the mayor maximized the village's assets and only indirectly his
own. 165
The court discounted the Fulton II argument that the trustees
may not always assess the highest possible withdrawal liability for fear
of discouraging participation. The court stated, "The due process
right to an unbiased decisionmaker is not satisfied by speculation that
countervailing concerns may restrain clearly biased parties from exces
sively harsh judgments." 166 The court emphasized that the procedural
due process right to an impartial decisionmaker is not a flexible right
to be balanced against other interests or the possibility that the deci
sion will not be excessively unfair. 167
The majority in Yahn then discussed the discretion of the trustees
in making their withdrawal liability determination. While stating that
a lack of discretion would negate the effects of the inherent bias, the
court found the trustees to have "wide and significant discretion."168
The court cited the facts of Fulton II in which the trustees had chosen
a discount rate of 7.5%, but expert testimony established that 14.5%
would also have been a reasonable rate and thus a permissible
choice. 169 Given the significant differences in these two reasonable
and permissible choices, the court found the trustees to have wide dis
cretion. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit also argued that
the trustees have such significant discretion that, by manipulating
by an officer appointed by the approved carrier). The Yahn court surmised that the trust
ees' bias was greater than the bias of the decisionmakers in Friedman or Schweiker, thus
their partiality exceeded the limits of procedural due process. Yahn, 787 F.2d at 139.
162. 453 U.S. 322 (1981). In Amax Coal, the Court held that trustees of a muItiem
ployer pension fund established under the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.c.
§§ 141-87 (1982), had an "unwavering duty of complete loyalty to the beneficiary of the
trust." Id. at 329.
163. Yahn, 787 F.2d at 139.
164. Id. The court based this argument on 29 U.S.c. § 1109(a) (1982) which pro
vides that: "Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the
responsibilities, obligations or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this title shall be person
ally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach
...." Id.
165. Yahn, 787 F.2d at 139. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text for dis
cussion of Ward.
166. Yahn, 787 F.2d at 139.
167. See id. at 141.
168. Id. at 140.
169. Id.
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their calculations, they may determine that an employer has no liabil
ity or substantial liability.!70 The Yahn court stated that these pos
sibilities contradict the notion that the trustees act in a "ministerial
capacity."!7! Thus, according to the court, the trustees exercised wide
discretion, increasing the problem of their inherent bias.!72
The court considered whether arbitration, with a presumption of
correctness afforded to the trustees' findings, could successfully elimi
nate the trustees' bias, and held that it could not.173 In citing Good
man v. Laborers'International Union,!74 the court stated, "where an
initial hearing is tainted by bias, arbitration cannot provide the r~qui
site fair hearing if the arbitration proceeding is not de novo."!75 While
the presumptions may be a rational means of "promoting uniformity
and discouraging litigation," the Yahn court held that they do not
conform to the standards of procedural due process.!76
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit discussed the sever
ability of the presumption provisions of the MPPAA, and concluded
that a de novo review of the trustees' findings would be sufficient to
meet procedural due process requirements.!77 In a very brief discus
sion, the majority opinion cited cases from the Seventh and Ninth Cir
cuit Courts of Appeals that held de novo review eliminates the ill
effects of bias in the decisionmaking process. !78 The court distin
170. Id. at 141.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. 742 F.2d 780 (3d Cir. 1984). Goodman was charged in a union disciplinary
proceeding for exceeding his authority as the local's business manager. The trial level of
the internal union disciplinary process barred Goodman from holding elective office for five
years. Goodman claimed the members of the trial board were biased against him and ap
pealed to the union's concededly unbiased Executive Board, which affirmed the trial
board's finding. On the facts of the case, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held
that the Executive Board's review did not constitute an independent determination of the
dispute.
175. Yahn, 787 F.2d at 141.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 142-44. The Yahn court followed the same reasoning as the First Circuit
Court of Appeals in Fulton I for severing the presumption provision of the statute. See
supra note 133 for discussion of that authority.
178. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals cited Perry v. Milk Drivers' and Dairy
Employees' Union Local 302, 656 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1981) and Rosario v. Amalgamated
Ladies' Garment Cutters' Union Local 10, 605 F.2d 1228 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 919 (1980). In Perry, the court held that in that particular case involving the review of
a one year suspension from union activity and a $225 fine imposed on the plaintiff for
unauthorized picketing, de novo review by a Teamsters Joint Council cured any defects
caused by the bias of the Local 302 trial panel. Perry, 656 F.2d at 539. In Rosario, the
appellees were also suspended from the union for one year by the Local after an altercation
in a manager's office. Rosario, 605 F.2d at 1235. After three tainted hearings, the court
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guished the holding in Ward which provided that a state could not
cure its constitutionally defective procedure by eventually offering the
complainant an "impartial adjudication."179
In summary, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Yahn, adopt
ing most of the reasoning of Fulton I and Judge Aldrich's dissent in
Fulton IL found the MPPAA's decisionmaking process for assessing
withdrawal liability to be violative of the fifth amendment right to due
process. To remedy the constitutional defect, the court severed the
provision affording a presumption of correctness to the biased findings
of the trustees. ISO The focus of this note now shifts to whether the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit was correct in holding the MP
PAA's decisionmaking process unconstitutional and then severing the
presumption clause from the statute.

III.
A.

JUDICIAL CONCEPTS OF DECISIONMAKER BIAS

The Standard of Review

In analyzing claims of decisionmaker bias under the statutory
scheme of the MPPAA the courts have employed a number of stan
dards of review. The court in Fulton II invoked the principle from
Turner Elkhorn, a case involving a substantive due process chal
lenge. lsl However, since it is well settled that the rationality test for
determining substantive due process rights is not directly applicable to
procedural due process claims,ls2 the court in Fulton II was mistaken
in applying this test.
Several courts invoked the Mathews balancing test to determine
the sufficiency of the procedural framework. IS3 Although applicable
held that a de novo review cured the defects caused by bias in the first three hearings. Id. at
1244.
179. Yahn, 787 F.2d at 143 n.23. In this footnote, the court stated that the Ward
facts involved the neutrality of an adjudicative setting. Although it offered little reasoning
for its conclusion, the court stated that the trustees' role was less than adjudicative. Be
cause of this distinction, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated that the Ward
holding was not controlling. See supra discussion in section II (A) of this note for an
examination of the trustees' role as adjudicators and infra notes 235-39 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the propriety of the court's finding that the Ward holding was not
controlling.
180. Yahn, 787 F.2d at 143-44.
181. See supra note 154 for a discussion of the facts and holding in Turner Elkhorn.
182. See supra note 155.
183. Only the Courts of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Thompson, the panel of the
First Circuit in Fulton I, and the Third Circuit in Yahn did not balance the interests articu
lated in Mathews. However, of the other courts which did proclaim to invoke the Mathews
balancing test, only the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Standard Dye enumer
ated the particular interests to be balanced in the Mathews test.
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to the evaluation of some, and perhaps most, procedural due process
cases, this test is not appropriate for determining the fairness of the
MPPAA procedures for calculating withdrawal liability. 184 As argued
by the Yahn court, the Mathews balancing test is not appropriate for
evaluating an allegation of decisionmaker bias. 18s The Mathews test
seeks to balance the interests of the individual in an accurate decision
making process against the interests of the government in the efficient
resolution to challenges to government action. It assumes that certain
procedural safeguards may not always be necessary to protect individ
ual interests in light of the limited risk of erroneous deprivation and
the burden imposed on government efficiency. For example, the
Supreme Court has held in certain circumstances that due process
mandates a hearing prior to deprivation of certain property inter
ests.186 However, where the deprivation involves the summary sus
pension of a driver's license for refusal to submit to a breath-analysis
test upon arrest for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of
intoxicating liquor, the Court has held that the modest interest of con
tinued possession and use of a driver's license is outweighed by the
government interest in removing potentially hazardous drivers from
the highways. 187 A hearing after the suspension is sufficient to protect
the individual's procedural due process right in that circumstance. 188
Thus, while Mathews is applicable for the purpose of determining
the necessity, form, and appropriate time for a hearing, it is not appli
cable for determining the fairness of a prescribed hearing, including
the existence of bias in a decisionmaking process. Moreover, the Yahn
court correctly pointed out that since the Supreme Court decided Ma
thews in 1976, it has not used the balancing analysis for resolving cases
184. Redish & Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural
Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 472 (1986) ("The word 'fairness' did not appear in the
balancing test ...." "Balancing can lead to the anomalous result that an individual will
have a clear due process right to no due process. ").
185. Yahn, 787 F.2d at 137-38. See Redish & Marshall, supra note 184, at 474. The
authors state that the balancing approach's "inadequacy lies in its inability to take into
account the traditional concerns of procedural justice that the framers most certainly in
tended ...." They further claim that the "Mathews balancing test threatens to undermine
wholly the viability of the guarantee" to procedural due process. Id. See also Developments
in the Law of Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427, 1524 (1978) ("This balancing approach
normally centers on whether a prior hearing is necessary . . . ."); Note, Specifying the
Procedures Required by Due Process: Towards Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1510 (1975) (recommending courts decide if procedures are consistent with
basic notions of decency and fair dealing instead of balancing).
186. See. e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-71 (1970) (procedural due pro
cess requires a pre-termination hearing prior to deprivation of welfare benefits).
187. See Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 10-19 (1978).
188. Id.
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of alleged decisionmaker bias. 189
The only MPPAA case to articulate and evaluate the balanced
interests, Standard Dye, illustrates the distinction between appropriate
and inappropriate uses of the Mathews test. In Standard Dye, the
court balanced the private interests, the risk of erroneous deprivation
and the government's interests and determined that "the legislative
scheme employed by Congress for the collection of employer with
drawal liability was rational . . . ."190 However, the court did not
discuss decisionmaker bias in its balancing analysis; that discussion
occurred in a subsequent section, 19 I where the court examined the
"fairness" of the decisionmaking process and found no unfairness. 192
Having eliminated the applicability and usefulness of the Turner
Elkhorn and Mathews 193 tests in this procedural due process context,
the remaining standard for this type of case is the principle drawn
from Morrissey v. Brewer 194 that "due process is flexible and calls for
such procedural protection as the particular situation demands."195
189. Yahn, 787 F.2d at 138.
190. Standard Dye, 725 F.2d at 854. See supra note 71 for a discussion of the inter
ests balanced.
191. See Standard Dye, 725 F.2d at 854-55. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit used the Mathews test in a section which it called "Denial of the Due Process
Rights to a Prepayment Hearing." Id. at 854. It was the next section of the court's analy
sis, called "Denial of Access to the Courts and Trial by Jury," that addressed the issue of
decisionmaker bias. Id. at 854-55.
192. Id. at 855 ("[Wle perceive no unfairness in Congress' decision to place the ini
tial determination of withdrawal liability on the trustees and to provide that the Fund's
determination is presumptively correct.").
193. While the Mathews balancing test is inapplicable in this circumstance, even
where it is applicable, noted constitutional scholars have questioned its utility. Professor
Gerald Gunther has termed the test "not a wholly informative one." G. GUNTHER, CON
STITUTIONAL LAW 584 (lith ed. 1985). Professor Laurence Tribe has stated that, "there
are serious problems in striking the balance called for by decisions like Eldridge." L.
TRIBE, supra note 155, at 542. According to Professor Jerry Mashaw, "The failing of
Eldridge is its focus on questions of technique rather than on questions of value. That
focus, it is argued, generates an inquiry that is incomplete because unresponsive to the full
range of concerns embodied in the due process clause." Mashaw, The Supreme Court's
Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Fac
tors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 30 (1976). The balancing
approach is problematic and imprecise as courts must allocate arbitrary weights to intangi
ble concepts. Perhaps this is why many of the courts that claimed to use the Mathews
standard failed to identify the factors used in the application of the test.
194. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
195. Id. at 481. The flexible approach of Morrissey remains good law after the Ma
thews decision. Indeed, the Mathews balancing test can be viewed as a particular applica
tion of the Morrissey flexibility principle. Because Mathews applies only to the
determination of what type of hearing, if any, is necessary, Morrissey remains in effect for
resolution of other due process questions. The Supreme Court has, in fact, cited Mathews
and Morrissey together in support of the proposition that due process is flexible and depen
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The application of this broad standard to a particular situation re
quires an understanding of the specific due process right and the spe
cific context in which it arises.
The right to an impartial decisionmaker has developed in a long
series of cases, beginning with quasi-criminal adjudications. In Tumey
v. Ohio,196 the Supreme Court stated that it was a violation of due
process for a judge to try a case in which he had "a direct, personal,
substantial, pecuniary interest" in the outcome.l 97 The Court further
stated that any procedure with a "possible temptation" to inject bias
was violative of due process. 198 This right to an impartial deci
sionmaker, according to Supreme Court precedent and legal scholar
ship, is elemental and essential. In Morrissey, the Court noted that a
"'neutral and detached' hearing body" was a "minimum" requiredent on the particular situation. See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2595 (1986);
Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985).
196. 273 U.S. 510 (1927). In Tumey the petitioner challenged the constitutionality
of an Ohio statute that required rural mayors to try cases involving offenses against state
prohibition. The statute provided for the payment of a fee and costs to the mayor if, and
only if, he convicted the defendant.
197. Id. at 523. The Court has termed this notion "actual bias," In re Murchison,
349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955), and has reiterated it in a number of contexts. In Withrow v.
Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975), the Court invalidated a Wisconsin statute that gave an examin
ing board comprised entirely of licensed doctors, the power to reprimand unlicensed doc
tors. The Court held that the examining board's pecuniary interest in reducing the number
of licensed doctors, thereby reducing their competition, created actual bias. Id. at 47.
The Court delineated another example of actual bias in Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400
U.S. 455 (1971). In Mayberry, a criminal defendant was sentenced by a judge whom the
defendant had defamed and embarrassed during the trial. The fact that the judge had been
previously subjected to personal abuse and criticism by the defendant constituted actual
bias, and it violated procedural due process to permit the judge to sentence that defendant.
Id. at 465-66.
For other examples of actual bias, see, e.g., Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973)
(optometry review board, comprised of practicing optometrists, could profit by revoking
other optometrists' licenses); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1975) Gudge who served as
one man grand jury cannot later adjudge witness from grand jury proceeding in contempt);
cf Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238 (1980) (statute under which determinations and assess
ment of penalties for violations of child labor laws are made by regional administrators of
Department of Labor, and money from penalties is returned to the Department, did not
violate due process because administrators act in prosecutorial capacity and are subject to
review by administrative law judges).
198. Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532. In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), the Court
held that it violated due process for a decisionmaker in a hearing for welfare eligibility to
have participated in.the determination under review. Id. at 271. In Offutt v. United States,
348 U.S. 11 (1954), a lawyer was convicted and sentenced for contempt by the same judge.
In holding that the contempt proceedings must be tried by a different judge the Court
stated that, "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice." Id. at 14. This concept has
been called "apparent bias." Note, Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc.: Unconscionability ofPre
sumptively Biased Arbitration Clauses Within Adhesion Contracts, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1014,
1021 n.40 (1982).
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ment of due process. 199 In his article Some Kind of Hearing, the late
Judge Henry J. Friendly stated that "an unbiased tribunal is a neces
sary element in every case where a hearing is required ...."200
Under this approach, procedural due process challenges involving
decisionmaker bias are not to be reviewed under a rational basis
test,201 or a balancing test,202 to determine whether the partiality of a
procedure is tolerable. Rather, the "particular situation" of a possibly
199. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 488-89. The Supreme Court restated the proposition that
the right to an impartial decisionmaker is an elemental and essential right earlier in the
same month that the Third Circuit Court of Appeals decided Yahn. In Chicago Teachers
Union, Local 1 v. Hudson, 106 S. Ct. 1066 (1986), a case involving proportionate share
payments by non-union teachers to the teachers' union, the Court held that a prompt and
impartial hearing was "necessary" when a non-union teacher challenged the amount of the
proportionate share payment. Id. at 1076. The Court also stated in Goldberg, 397 U.S. at
271, that "an impartial decisionmaker is essential." Cf Board of Curators of the Univ. of
Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978) (procedure for expelling medical student for academic
insufficiency is constitutional where academic evaluation and initial determination of
course of action for student is made by same decisionmaking body); Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565 (1975) (suspension procedure for high school students in which principal levies
charges and conducts review is constitutional as long as notice and hearing on charges
follows as soon as practicable after suspension).
Although not dealing primarily with decisionmaker bias, these cases show that deci
sionmakers with an appearance of bias, stemming from their involvement in the decision
under review, may in some circumstances participate in the decisionmaking process with
out violating due process. To reconcile these cases with Goldberg, where the Court found
previous participation in a determination under review to be violative of the due process
right to an impartial decisionmaker, one must limit Goss and Horowitz to their educational
setting.
200. Friendly, Some Kind 0/ Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1279 (1975). Of the
eleven "Elements of a Fair Hearing" listed "roughly in order of priority" by Judge
Friendly, the right to an impartial decisionmaker was first. Id. at 1278. See also Redish &
Marshall, supra note 184. The Redish and Marshall article lends substantial support to the
proposition that the procedural due process right to an impartial decisionmaker is elemen
tal and essential. The authors state that "the participation of an independent adjudicator is
... an essential safeguard." Id. at 475. They further claim that the other due process
rights of hearing and notice, while important, are of little value without an impartial deci
sionmaker. In highlighting the overarching importance of an impartial decisionmaker,
Redish and Marshall declare:
Even though the Supreme Court has often stated that the core rights of due pro
cess are notice and hearing ... under certain circumstances the values of due
process might arguably be safeguarded absent those specific procedural protec
tions. None of the core values of due process, however, can be fulfilled without
.
the participation of an independent adjudicator.
Id. at 475-76 (footnote omitted).
Other legal literature concurs in this assessment. See; e.g., R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO &
P. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS, § 9.2.1 (1985) ("neutrality is viewed
as a due process imperative"); Developments in the Law o/Zoning, supra note 185, at 1525
26 ("[A] common requirement of all due process hearings, 'central to the very notion of
procedural fairness and regularity' ... is an impartial decisionmaker.").
201. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 184-92 and accompanying text.
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biased hearing requires the "procedural protection" of an impartial
decisionmaker. 203 This approach requires a working definition of bias.
The note's discussion now addresses that issue.
B.

Standards of Bias

The Supreme Court has described two types of bias; actual bias,
where the decisionmaker has a personal or financial stake in the out
come,204 and apparent bias, where the decisionmaker is in a position,
or has some interest, that may not amount to actual bias, but can be
perceived as adverse to the interests of a party to the determination. 20s
As fiduciaries of the plan under the Multiemployer Pension Plan
Amendments Act of 1980,206 the trustees are tainted by both actual
and apparent bias. The fiduciary duty to the plan, and its incumbent
duty to act solely in the interests of the participants, prevents the trust
203. See supra note 195 and accompanying text. See also Rubin, Due Process and the
Administrative State, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 1044, 1139 (1984) (purpose of due process is to
establish uniform standards of fair adjudication, not degrees of fairness that can be ex
changed for injury).
204. See supra note 197 and accompanying text. The Court has not enumerated
specific guidelines for determining the existence of actual bias. In In re Murchison, 349
U.S. 133 (1955), the Court stated the settled rule that a judge cannot try cases in which he
has a personal interest in the outcome, and that "[t]hat interest cannot be defined with
precision. Circumstances and relationships must be considered." Id. at 136.
The Redish & Marshall article enumerates three situations which pose a danger of
partiality. The first two are identical to those set forth by the Supreme Court; that is, a
financial interest in the outcome of the case, and a personal bias toward a party. Redish &
Marshall, supra note 184, at 492. The authors also state that the decisionmaker must not
be "predisposed toward a certain position that a party maintains in the case." Id. The
authors point out that this type of bias is easy to eliminate by simply finding a disinterested
adjudicator; thus, it should never be tolerated. Id. at 502. Redish and Marshall go on to
say that it is difficult to determine how much temptation exists; thus, in reality, we must
accept some bias. Id. at 492. However, if it is possible to remove it, we must do so no
matter how slight the potential bias may be. Id.
205. See supra note 198. The Redish and Marshall article suggests that the appear
ance of fairness is just as essential as actual fairness for the purposes of the procedural due
process right to an impartial decision maker. The authors state:
Of all the values informing the due process guarantee, the perception-of-fairness
value most clearly dictates use of a truly independent adjudicator. Whether or
not it can be proven that a particular decisionmaker allows her personal interests
to sway her resolution of a dispute, the perception-of-fairness value demands that
she be enjoined from deciding the case if she has some identifiable potential bias.
Few situations more severely threaten trust in the judicial process than the per
ception that a litigant never had a chance because the decisionmaker may have
owed the other side special favors.
Redish & Marshall, supra note 184, at 483. Thus, both Supreme Court precedent and legal
literature suggest that the procedural due process right to an impartial decision maker ex
tends beyond actual bias to protect against even apparent bias.
206. See supra note 21.
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ees from exhibiting the requisite appearance of fairness. 207 Their ac
tual financial stake in the outcome creates actual bias. They are
potentially personally liable to the plan if they breach their fiduciary
duties. 208 If the trustees were to assess withdrawal liabilities that did
not create sufficient funds to meet the unfunded vested liabilities, they
could be found to have violated their fiduciary duty to act in the best
interest of the plan's participants and beneficiaries. In such a case, the
trustees would be personally liable for the plan's losses. 209 This finan
cial exposure, although attenuated, should be regarded as actual bias
sufficient to violate the due process right to an impartial
decisionmaker.210
There is also another source of personal bias against the with
drawing employer.211 One half of the trustees for each plan are repre
sentatives or employees of employers that contribute to the plan. As
207. See United Retail & Wholesale Employees Teamsters Union Local 115 Pension
Plan v. Yahn & McDonnell, Inc., 787 F.2d 128, 139 (3d Cir. 1986), prob.juris. noted, 107
S. Ct. 567 (1986); Keith Fulton & Sons, Inc. v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Indus.
Pension Fund, Inc., 762 F.2d 1124, 1134 (1st Cir. 1984).
In Fulton II the court stated that although the trustees were fiduciaries and they had
to act in the best interests of the plan, that did not necessarily mean they were biased
against the employers. Fulton II, 762 F.2d 1137, 1142. The plan argued that the trustees
could not assess the highest possible withdrawal liability because it would discourage other
employers from joining the plan and could adversely effect their own employer if it were to
withdraw. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. However, trustees might forego
such long term goals in favor of short term results through the more substantial goal of
increasing the plan's present assets by assessing high withdrawal liabilities. Therefore,
notwithstanding the possibility that the trustees could choose to foster long term goals for
the plan by assessing low withdrawal liabilities, the possibility that the trustees could
choose to act in the interest of increasing the plan's present assets by assessing the highest
possible withdrawal liabilities, in order to protect the current contributing employers, vio
lates the appearance offaimess requirement ofthe right to an impartial decisionmaker. See
supra notes 198 & 205 and accompanying text. It also can be argued that this fiduciary
duty creates actual bias. See infra notes 208-10 and accompanying text.
208. See Yahn, 787 F.2d at 139 (citing Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell,
105 S. Ct. 3085 (1985». See also supra note 164.
209. See supra note 164.
210. See supra note 197 and accompanying text. Professor Redish and Mr. Marshall
state that "any financial temptation, regardless of how indirect or insubstantial" is sufficient
to establish bias. Redish & Marshall, supra note 184, at 496.
211. It is also arguable that a trustee could have a personal bias against the plan.
Although the trustees are required by 29 U.S.C. § 1I04(a)(2) (1982) to act "solely in the
interest of the participants and beneficiaries," if a withdrawing employer appointed one of
the trustees and that trustee feels allegiant to the employer, he could be personally biased
against the plan. 29 U.S.c. § 1106(b)(2) (1982) provides that a plan fiduciary shall not "act
in any transaction involving the plan on behalf of a party (or represent a party) whose
interests are adverse to the interests of the plan or the interests of its participants or benefi
ciaries ...." 29 U.S.c. § 1108(b)(IO) (1982) states that the provisions of § 1106 shall not
apply to any transaction "required or permitted" under the MPPAA, such as the calcula
tion of withdrawal liability. Thus, trustees appointed by withdrawing employers are not
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such, they may have a personal interest in protecting their own future
retirement benefits and protecting their employer from financial strain.
They may also have a personal interest in protecting their jobs as
trustees. 212 By assessing high withdrawal liabilities on the withdraw
ing employers, they increase the plan's assets and its probability of
remaining solvent, thus protecting their own future benefits and their
jobs as trustees. High withdrawal liabilities also decrease the financial
burden on the remaining and future employers of having to satisfy
withdrawn employers' unfunded vested benefits. All of these factors
create a personal bias against the withdrawing employers which pre
cludes the trustees from being impartial decisionmakers. Therefore,
the trustees' participation in the calculation of withdrawal liability vio
lates the withdrawing employers' due process rights. 213
C. Decisionmaker Discretion
Following its determination that bias existed, the court in Yahn
considered whether a lack of discretion in the decisionmaking process
nullified the bias. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Yahn stated
that, "[i]f the trustees had no discretion, their bias would obviously be
insignificant."214 This conclusion is inconsistent with the principle
that the right to an impartial hearing is elemental and essential. Even
if the trustees cannot exercise discretion in making their determina
tions of withdrawal liability, their inherent bias defeats the necessary
appearance of impartiality to protect the procedural due process right
to an impartial decisionmaker.215
While the absence of discretion in the trustees' role would not
eliminate the problem of trustee bias, it would reduce the concern over
actual bias and transform the case into an example of apparent bias.
Therefore, it is important to consider the scope of the discretion avail
able to the trustees. Under the MPPAA, the trustees may select one
of several methods for calculating withdrawal liability and then make
required to recuse themselves from determinations of withdrawal liability and may be bi
ased against the plan.
212. 29 U.S.C. § l108(c)(2) (1982) permits trustees to receive benefits or reasonable
compensation for their services.
213. See supra notes 197 & 204. This personal interest also can be categorized as a
predisposition in favor of the plan. The trustees are predisposed to assess high withdrawal
liabilities to increase the plan's assets in order to protect themselves and other participants,
as well as their employers, if their employers contribute to the plan. This is violative of the
third category of actual bias described in the Redish & Marshall article. See supra note
204.
214. Yahn. 787 F.2d at 140.
215. See supra notes 198 & 205.
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a number of actuarial assumptions in implementing that method. 216
This discretion is not contested by proponents of the MPPAA and, in
fact, the Fulton II court, in its rationale for support of the presump
tion, conceded the discretion. 217 Depending on the particular method
chosen and the actuarial assumptions made, withdrawal liabilities dif
fering by tens of thousands of dollars may be assessed. 2lS Thus, the
trustees' ability to choose among the methods and assumptions is not
insignificant to a withdrawing employer. The choices can have dra
matically different fiscal consequences depending on which method
and assumptions are used. While any amount of discretion, no matter
how narrow, is sufficient for the trustees potentially to inject their bi
ases, the trustees have more than de minimis discretion. 219 Therefore,
because the trustees can exercise "wide and significant discretion" in
the calculation of withdrawal liability,220 the decisionmaking provi
sions of the MPPAA are unconstitutional.
D.

Review of Biased Decisions

In accordance with the principle that there is a constitutional
right to an impartial hearing, the Yahn court held that the arbitration
clause of the MPPAA did not cure the constitutional defect in the
statute. 221 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals for the had previously
addressed the issue of the review of biased decisions in Goodman v.
216. See 29 U.S.c. §§ 1391 & 1393 (1982); supra notes 22-29 and accompanying
text. The MPPAA requires that the actuarial assumptions used in the calculation of with
drawal liability only be reasonable in the aggregate. See supra note 29 and accompanying
text. In Penn Textile Corp. v. Textile Workers Pension Fund, 3 Employee Benefits Cas.
(BNA) 1609 (1982) (Pritzker, Arb.), an arbitrator upheld an interest rate assumption of six
percent as reasonable in the calculation of withdrawal liability. Id. at 1624. The with
drawal liability using this interest rate was $188,000.00. Id. at 1617. The employer offered
evidence that insurance companies used interest rates between thirteen percent and fifteen
percent, and at fifteen percent the withdrawal liability would be $128,000.00. Id. The
employer also stated that the.then current PBGC interest rate assumption was eleven per
cent, which would lead to a withdrawal liability of $134,500.00. Id. Finally the employer
offered evidence that the interest rate the PBGC used for single employers was 9 1/4%,
which would result in a withdrawal liability of $148,500.00. Id. Despite this evidence, the
discretion afforded the trustees in deciding the rate to use enabled the arbitrator to uphold
their finding where an interest rate resulting in a withdrawal liability $60,000.00 less than
the amount imposed would also have been reasonable.
217. Fulton II, 762 F.2d 1137, 1142.
218. See supra note 216.
219. See id.
220. United Retail & Wholesale Employees Teamsters Union Local 115 Pension
Plan v. Yahn & McDonnell, Inc., 787 F.2d 128, 140 (3d Cir. 1986),prob.juris. noted, 107
S. Ct. 567 (1986).
221. Id. at 141; 29 U.S.c. § 1401(a) (1982).
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Laborers' International Union. 222 Stating that it was uncertain
whether de novo review could cure a tainted hearing,223 the court held
that such de novo review could certainly not redress the problem of a
tainted hearing compounded by a presumption of correctness. 224 Be
cause under the statutory scheme of the MPPAA, the arbitrator was
required to afford a presumption of correctness to the trustees' find
ings, the trustees' bias could be injected into the final determination,
thereby violating the right to an impartial decisionmaker.225 Thus, the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals properly concluded that the presump
tion clause of the MPPAA was in violation of the fifth amendment
right to procedural due process. Having ruled the decisionmaking
process of the MPPAA to be unconstitutional, the court had essen
tially disabled the operation of the statute. The court's next step was
to try to revitalize it.
IV.

THE ApPROPRIATE REMEDY FOR DECISIONMAKER BIAS

The previous discussion has delineated the principle that the pro
cedural due process right to an impartial decisionmaker is elemental
and essential, and that right applies to withdrawing employers under
the MPPAA because of the adjudicative nature of the decisionmaking
process. According to this principle, the appropriate remedy for a
procedure tainted with decisionmaker bias is to eliminate that deci
sionmaker from the process.
The Yahn court argued that procedural due process could be sat
isfied by severing the MPPAA's clause providing for a presumption of
correctness for the trustees' findings in any subsequent review, thereby
minimizing the effect of the trustees' bias in the calculation of with
222. 742 F.2d 780 (3d Cir. 1984). For a description of this case, see supra note 174
and accompanying text.
223. Goodman, 742 F.2d at 784-85. Legal scholars contend that instances of pure de
novo review are rare. "It is more useful to think of de novo review as a decision-making
process in which the court accords little deference to the agency's conclusion of law." R.
PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUlL, supra note 200, at § 7.4.1. "The theoretical right of
review is often illusory, as it is when ... the court is strongly influenced by the agency's
view, or when despite the theoretical right to de novo review the court limits its inquiry to
reasonableness." K. DAVIS, supra note 44, at § 7.11. In accordance with the understand
ing that the right to an impartial decision maker is essential and undeniable, a de novo
hearing would not satisfy the requirements of due process because the inevitable deference
afforded to the decisionmaker's determination, no matter how small, would permit the
decisionmaker's bias to be injected into the final determination, thus denying an impartial
hearing.
224. Goodman, 742 F.2d at 784-85.
225. Even without the presumption, the requirements of the due process right to an
impartial decision maker are not satisfied. See infra discussion beginning at note 228.
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drawalliability.226 The court cited two cases in support of the propo
sition that de novo review, specifically review by an arbitrator without
a presumption in favor of the trustees' findings, would cure any defects
caused by the trustees' bias. 227 However, those cases involved matters
much less technical than calculating withdrawal liability under the
MPPAA and addressed the cure of a single, past wrong, rather than a
procedure for the cure of future wrongs. 228 These distinctions are sig
nificant and undermine the strength of those cases as authority for
Yahn's remedial solution.
An analysis of the "particular situation" involved in the MPPAA
reveals the inadequacy of the Yahn remedy. Even without the arbitra
tor's presumption of correctness for the trustees' findings, the arbitra
tor is likely to give deference to those findings,229 especially in light of
the technical nature of the provisions for calculating withdrawalliabil
ity.230 In order for arbitrators or judges to render informed decisions
on withdrawal liability under the MPPAA, they would need extensive
knowledge of actuarial methods. Since this is not likely to be the case,
even with de novo review, the arbitrator or judge may be tempted to
defer to the actuarial findings of the biased trustees. If such deference
is afforded, the employers' procedural due process right to an impar
tial decisionmaker is violated. 231 Thus, the Third Circuit Court of Ap
226. Yahn, 787 F.2d at 143-44.
227. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
228. Those cases involved union suspensions and minimal fines for unauthorized
picketing and fighting. See supra note 178. In fact, the court in Perry explicitly stated that
it held only that the de novo review under those particular circumstances cured the prior
defects in that particular hearing process. Perry, 656 F.2d at 540. Therefore, the Perry
holding is expressly inapplicable to a process of review under the MPPAA.
The Rosario holding is also distinguishable from the MPPAA review scheme adopted
by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. In Rosario, the court ordered de novo review
by injunction, which barred the union appeal board from giving any force and effect to the
findings in the three previous tainted hearings. Rosario, 605 F.2d at 1244. The holding is,
therefore, distinguishable because it did not establish a procedure of general applicability
for future cases, which is the result when the presumption clause is removed from the
MPPAA. Instead, Rosario involved the cure of a single, past wrong in that case only. In
the opinion of the court, Judge Mansfield stated that there was not "any reason to believe
that, absent injunctive relief, the defendants ... will not in the future resume the foregoing
procedures [biased review] in violation of the rights of appellees and other union mem
bers." Id. at 1245. Thus, because the court did not establish a procedure for review of
future due process violations, but limited its holding to de novo review of a single, past
violation under the specific circumstances of that case, the Rosario reasoning should not be
applied to establish a procedure of general applicability for all future due process violations
under the MPPAA.
229. See supra note 223.
230. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1391 & 1393 (1982).
231. See supra note 223.
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peals in Yahn erred in attempting to cure the constitutional defect in
the MPPAA by severing the presumption clause and leaving the bi
ased decisionmakers in the process. 232
The court's reasoning for severing only the presumption provision
is further undermined by the recent holding in Chicago Teachers
Union, Local No.1 v. Hudson. 233 In Hudson, the Supreme Court held
that a procedure for challenging proportionate share payments from
non-union teachers' salaries did not comport with the due process
right to an impartial hearing. 234 The Court said, "[w]e reject the
Union's suggestion that the availability of ordinary judicial remedies is
sufficient. . .. [W]e presume that the courts remain available as the
ultimate protectors of constitutional rightS."235 This case bolsters the
notion that it is impermissible to establish a partial decision making
process and rely on the courts to correct the defects caused by the
procedure's partiality. The right to an impartial hearing is elemental
and essential and the Yahn court was incorrect and inconsistent in
finding the decisionmaking process of the MPPAA unconstitutional,
and then preserving the core of the constitutional defect within the
statute.
The reasoning used by the Yahn court to justify severing the pre
sumption provision and leaving the biased trustees in the decisionmak
ing process is flawed in another way as well. In severing the
presumption clause from the Act, the court was forced to distinguish
the holding in Ward, which stated that due process required a "neutral
and detached judge in the first instance."236 The Yahn court distin
guished Ward by stating that it only applied to adjudicative proce
dures and the trustees' role was not adjudicative. 237 However, this
statement is in direct conflict with the court's previous reasoning in
the case. Earlier in the opinion the majority stated, "[w]e must also
reject the suggestion, advanced tangentially by the majority in Keith
232. Yahn, 787 F.2d at 143-44.
233. 106 S. Ct. 1066 (1986).
234. Id. at 1074-77. The Court found that the union controlled completely the pro
cedure for reviewing proportionate share payment challenges, thus the procedure was not
impartial. Id. at 1077. Union officials conducted the initial consideration of the claim, and
the first two processes for reviewing the initial finding. Id. The third step in the review
process was review by an arbitrator selected by the union. Id.
235. Id. at 1076 n.20. The Court stated that the union must provide a prompt, im
partial decisionmaker in the first instance. Id. at 1076.
236. Yahn, 787 F.2d at 143 n.23 (citing Ward, 409 U.S. at 61-62).
237. Id. The Yahn court cited E.E.O.C. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 504 F. Supp. 241,
252 n.21 (N.D. Ill. 1980). Yahn, 787 F.2d at 143 n.23. The Yahn court summarized the
district court's holding by stating that the "Ward holding that de novo trial does not cure
earlier tainted hearing is limited to adjudicative setting." Id. (emphasis in original).
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Fulton, that the trustees' role is not adjudicative in nature .. : . The
trustees must frequently make complex legal and factual determina
tions."238 This appears to be an irreconcilable inconsistency in the
court's reasoning. According to the previous analysis in this note, the
trustees' role as decisionmakers is both adjudicative and legislative. 239
Because the adjudicative aspect of the decisionmaking process figures
prominently in the calculation of withdrawal liability,240 the Yahn
court erred in distinguishing the Ward holding to rationalize the sever
ance of the presumption clause. The appropriate remedy for the Yahn
court to have implemented, would have been to hold the decisionmak
ing process unconstitutional, as it did, and then eliminate the core of
the defective statute by removing the biased trustees from the process.
V.

CONCLUSION

In the 1970's the need for legislation to encourage participation in
multiemployer pension plans, and to protect the plans' beneficiaries
and participants was clearly apparent,241 Immediately following the
MPPAA's enactment, and in the wake of the political reality of its
necessity, the courts were highly supportive of its decisionmaking pro
visions. 242 However, through the chronological progression of cases,
the courts slowly became less supportive of the MPPAA's infringe
ment on the due process right to an impartial decisionmaker.243 While
all of the courts failed to establish adequately the basis for the with
drawing employers' constitutional rights, the courts properly recog
nized the employers' entitlement to some procedural due process
protection, even though many of the courts improperly balanced away
the protection under those rights. Yahn appears to be a logical step in
the evolution of judicial treatment of procedural due process claims
against the MPPAA involving the right to an impartial hearing.
Supreme Court precedent and legal scholarship demonstrate that the
right to an impartial decisionmaker is elemental and essential. The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Yahn adopted this view and the
court held that the decisionmaking process of the MPPAA was uncon
238. Id. at 141 n.18.
239. See supra discussion in section II (A).
240. See supra notes 29 & 216.
241. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
242. See generally section II (B) of this note. This section describes the courts' ac
ceptance of the MPPAA's decisionmaking provisions for a number of years after its
enactment.
243. This is illustrated by the gradual acceptance of the notion that the trustees har
bored an inherent bias, and, ultimately, the holding in Yahn striking down a portion of the
decisionmaking process of the MPP AA.
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stitutional. However, it improperly failed to sever the defective provi
sion from the Act by not requiring that the trustees be removed from
the decisionmaking process.
If the court had held the statutory provisions mandating the
trustees' role in the calculation of withdrawal liability to be unconsti
tutional, the Act would have essentially been rendered null and void.
The uncertainty under this circumstance would undoubtedly have led
to an increase in employer withdrawals, and threatened the existence
of mUltiemployer pension plans and the financial security of the plans'
participants and beneficiaries. The court's treatment of the MPPAA in
Yahn might serve as a warning to Congress to amend the Act.
There are several possible ways that Congress could amend the
MPPAA to better conform to due process standards. One method is
to provide for each plan and its contributing employers to appoint an
independent and unbiased actuary to calculate withdrawal liability. In
his dissent in Fulton II, Judge Aldrich proposed just such a cure. 244
However, the appointment of an independent actuary is not infallible.
There may still be an issue of decisionmaker bias if the actuary is hired
or paid by either the plan or the employers.
Another method of improving the decisionmaking process of the
MPPAA would be to eliminate its adjudicative aspects, thereby mini
mizing or removing the employers fifth amendment due process pro
tection. This method also faces difficulty in two respects. First, it
would be difficult to establish rigid, future-oriented standards for de
termination of actuarial assumptions and termination dates before any
employers withdraw. It is very difficult to predict with accuracy, eco
nomic and social conditions over extensive periods of time. Second,
the legitimacy of the trustees as rulemakers could be questioned.
While the legitimacy of Congress to legislate is beyond question, the
delegation of that authority to the trustees would have to be accompa
nied by "regularized procedures" and be "subject to judicial
review. "245
A third alternative to solving the constitutional problems of the
MPPAA's decisionmaking process is for the trustees and employers to
appoint a hearing officer who would act in a capacity similar to that of
an administrative law judge. 246 The officer would hear disputes and
244. Fulton II, 762 F.2d 1137, 1151 (Aldrich, J., dissenting).
245. R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUlL, supra note 200, at § 6.4.6.
246. The Administrative Procedure Act,S U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06, 1305, 3105,
3344, 7521 (1982), provides that an administrative law judge may:
(1) administer oaths and affirmations;
(2) issue subpoenas authorized by law;
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recommend decisions concerning withdrawal liability. Again, this
scheme is faced with the problem of one side having more influence
than the other in the selection and compensation of the hearing officer.
These are only three of many possibilities that could be consid
ered to remedy the unconstitutional decision making process of the
MPPAA. While these solutions may also have constitutional difficul
ties, they provide a basis from which Congress could create a process
that meets the procedural due process requirement of an impartial
decisionmaker.
The United States Supreme Court must now render a final deci
sion on the constitutionality of the MPPAA's decisionmaking process.
If the Court rules in accordance with its precedent and scholarship on
the topic, it will hold that the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amend
ments Act's procedure for determination and review of withdrawallia
bility denies the elemental and essential due process right to an
impartial decisionmaker. The Court will then invalidate both the pre
sumption provisions and, more basically, the trustees' role in the deci
sionmaking process. Inevitably, Congress will have to address this
problem and amend the MPPAA.

Craig A. Raabe

(3) rule on offers of proof and receive relevant evidence;
(4) take depositions or have depositions taken when the ends of justice would be
served;
(5) regulate the course of the hearing;
(6) hold conferences for the settlement or simplification of the issues by consent
of the parties;
(7) dispose of procedural requests or similar matters;
(8) make or recommend decisions in accordance with section 557 of this title [5
U.S.C.S. § 557]; and
(9) take other action authorized by agency rule consistent with this subchapter [5
U.S.C.S. §§ 551 et seq.].
5 U.S.C. 556(c) (1982). According to Professor Schwartz, an administrative law judge "is
not limited to the position of referee between contending parties; his function is to see that
facts are clearly and fully developed. He is not required to sit idly by and permit a confused
or meaningless record to be made.' " B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 42, at § 6.15 (citing Bethle
hem Steel Co. v. NLRB, 120 F.2d 641, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1941». Therefore, a hearing officer
acting in the capacity of an administrative law judge could take in all the relevant evidence
and hear from witnesses and offer a decision concerning withdrawal liability.

